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Abstract
This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that
have external effects on other members of the organization. Because
of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to
internalize these effects in the decision maker’s objective. The optimal
assignment of decision rights minimizes the resulting inefficiencies. We
illustrate this in a principal–agent model where the principal retains
the authority to select ‘large’ projects but delegates the decision right
to the agent to implement ‘small’ projects. Extensions of the model
discuss the role of effort incentives, asymmetric information and multi-
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1 Introduction
The most important decisions in an organization affect not only the deci-
sion maker but also other members of the organization. The decision maker
therefore exerts an externality on other parties within the organization. As
an example, consider the merger or acquisition decision of a firm. When the
firm owners are endowed with the right to take such decisions, they probably
fail to internalize the full impact of their decision on the benefits and costs
of the management. Similarly, when the management decides, it is likely to
take the shareholders’ concerns only partially into account. Who then should
have the authority to decide over mergers and acquisitions?
In this paper we explain the allocation of decision rights as a response
to the problem of externalities and contractual incompleteness. In a world
of complete contracts, the members of an organization could simply write
a comprehensive contract to implement those decisions that maximize their
joint surplus. In line with the Coase Theorem, the benefits and costs of the
different members would be fully internalized by monetary transfers under
the organization’s compensation scheme. Yet, as Grossman and Hart (1986),
Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) point out, it is typically impossi-
ble to specify all the organization’s future decisions in advance in a legally
binding way. This is so because the details of different decisions are often
not verifiable to outsiders and the courts or prohibitively costly to specify ex
ante.
When decisions are not contractible, the party holding the decision right
will opportunistically select a decision in its own interest and may fail to
maximize the organization’s overall surplus.1 Under the optimal allocation
of authority, therefore, the decision right should be given to the party whose
behavior minimizes the resulting loss of surplus. Indeed, the transfer of de-
cision rights is perhaps the most important feature that distinguishes trans-
actions within a firm from market transactions (cf. Coase (1937) and Simon
(1951)). The employees of a firm not only provide inputs; they also accept
and receive authority over different aspects of the firm’s activity.
As Aghion and Tirole (1997), we assume that the residual control over
decisions in a certain area can be contractually assigned to a specific party.
While some decisions or actions cannot be contracted upon, it is possible
to specify in a contract who has the authority to undertake them. For ex-
1As Simon (1951, p. 302) observes, in the employer–worker relationship “the worker
has no assurance that the employer will consider anything but his own profit in deciding
what he will ask the worker to do”.
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ample, a member or a section of the firm may be given the autonomy over
financial transactions because it is impractical to specify the optimal finan-
cial decisions for all possible contingencies. As Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990) emphasize, also the ownership of assets may be
a mechanism to allocate control rights within the firm. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) argue that the regulation of access to resources may be an alterna-
tive mechanism to allocate power. Rather than by an explicit contract, the
allocation of authority may also be supported implicitly as a self–enforcing
agreement in a repeated interaction (see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999)
and Bolton and Rajan (2000)).
The assumption that authority can be contractually allocated has some
similarity with the “task assignment” literature (see e.g. Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991)), which considers the optimal assignment of tasks to the
members of an organization.2 Yet, there is an important difference between
this literature and our modelling of the assignment of decision rights: In
the “task assignment” problem the agent who becomes responsible for a
task also bears the cost of performing this task. In contrast, the essence of
our model is that the decision maker may affect the other agents’ payoffs
from performing their task. As an example, the tasks of a firm’s production
workers is to produce output; but the management may affect their disutility
of work when it has the right to decide which production technology the firm
adopts.
Our analysis considers a principal who hires an agent to implement one
out of several feasible projects. Each project generates a verifiable random
output for the principal; the agent’s cost, however, is non–verifiable. Be-
cause projects with a higher expected output are more costly for the agent,
the preferences of the two parties over different projects are a priori opposed
to each other. Therefore, the contractual agreement not only entails a com-
pensation scheme for the agent but also specifies which party has the right
to select a project. In principle, the compensation scheme could be used
to align the parties’ preferences over the choice of a project. But such an
alignment requires the agent’s compensation to depend on the realisation of
output. This implies a loss of surplus in the form of inefficient risk sharing.
As a result, monetary incentives only partially resolve the problem of ex-
ternalities: When the principal retains the authority over project selection,
he fails to internalize the impact of his decision on the agent’s cost. He is
therefore biased towards choosing ‘large’ projects with high expected output
2In this literature, the assignment of tasks interacts with the agents’ effort incentives.
We consider the role of such incentives for the allocation of authority in Section 3.
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and high cost. Conversely, the agent tends to select ‘small’ projects since he
bears the full cost and receives at most a fraction of the output. Because of
the biases in the parties’ decision behavior, the optimal allocation of control
rights will not generally implement the first–best project. The principal is
more likely to retain the control right if the second–best project is relatively
‘large’; he optimally delegates the authority to the agent if the second–best
project is relatively ‘small’.
A number of additional factors may influence the externality problem
associated with authority. One such factor is moral hazard. We can extend
our model to a situation where after the choice of a project the agent may
increase the project’s output by investing effort. We show that there are
complementarities between decision rights and effort incentives which favor
delegation of control to the agent. Another factor that we can integrate into
our model is asymmetric information. It turns out that under an optimal
mechanism not only the compensation scheme but also the allocation of the
decision right may be contingent on the revelation of private information.
Finally, we consider a sequential decision process and show that it may be
optimal to divide control rights at different stages of this process.
Our approach to the allocation of power in organizations is not based on
ex–ante investment incentives, which distinguishes it from other explanations
in the literature. In the theory of vertical integration developed by Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995), the ownership
of assets is identified with residual control rights. These rights define the
default options when bargaining over transactions or decisions takes place.
The party having the residual control right can appropriate a larger share
of the bargaining surplus and so has a higher incentive to make ex ante
relationship–specific investments. It is the efficiency of these investments
that determines the optimal allocation of property rights and, henceforth, of
authority. In our model there is no hold–up problem of specific investments,
even though it could be extended to include such investments. Also, in
the property rights approach to the theory of the firm decisions are non–
describable ex ante at the contracting stage; but they are legally verifiable
ex post at the bargaining and renegotiation stage.3 Our analysis sidesteps
potential problems with this assumption by considering decisions as neither
ex ante nor ex post verifiable. This also implies that in our model decisions
may turn out not be Pareto–optimal because – even ex post – inefficiencies
cannot be negotiated away.
3The consistency of this assumption is discussed in Hart–Moore (1999), Maskin–Tirole
(1999a,b) and Segal (1999).
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Holmstrom and Hart (2002) also adopt a framework in which decisions are
non–contractible not only ex ante but also ex post.4 They focus on the firm
boundaries by investigating whether integration or non–integration is the op-
timal organisational form. Under non–integration each production unit has a
separate manager, which may lead to too little coordination between different
units. This inefficiency may be overcome through integration, under which
an outside manager receives authority over the production units. While this
solves the coordination problem, the outside manager fails to take into ac-
count the private benefits of the unit managers. Holmstrom and Hart (2002)
show that a first–best outcome can be achieved by selecting the appropriate
organisational form.5
In Aghion and Tirole (1997) authority affects the incentives to invest
in information gathering. The delegation of formal authority entitles the
agent to select his preferred project and, therefore, increases his initiative to
acquire information about the benefits of different projects. As long as the
principal’s and the agent’s objectives are at least partially aligned, delegation
may increase the principal’s payoff because extremely poor projects are more
likely to be screened out. In our model, the principal and the agent are
fully informed about the benefits and costs of all feasible projects. Also
their preferences over different projects are a priori opposed to each other.
They become partially congruent with each other only through monetary
incentives, which play a minor role in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
While in Aghion and Tirole (1997) both parties are initially uninformed,
Dessein (2002) assumes that the principal deals with a better informed agent.
He can either delegate control rights to the agent or keep authority and
rely on the agent’s willingness to communicate information. As we show in
Section 4, asymmetric information of this kind can easily be incorporated in
our basic framework. Indeed, it turns out that the allocation of authority
itself may be useful as an incentive mechanism for information revelation.
Under an efficient contract control rights may depend on private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study
the allocation of decision rights in a basic framework. Section 3 extends
this framework by introducing inalienable private effort incentives. The role
of asymmetric information about project characteristics is investigated in
Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the allocation of authority in a sequential
decision environment. Finally, Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
4Another model with this feature is Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2001).
5This property of their model seems to rely on the assumption that each production
unit faces a binary decision problem; cf. Section 2 of this paper.
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2 Authority and Externalities
A principal and an agent can jointly implement a project. The set of available
projects is D. If project di ∈ D is selected, the principal receives the output
Xi + ε, (1)
with Xi ≥ 0. The variable ε is random and normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2 > 0. Thus decision di determines the mean output Xi
and the project risk is measured by σ2. The agent’s cost of implementing
project di is Ci ≥ 0.
We assume that the selection of a particular project is not verifiable
to outsiders and, hence, not contractible. Only the output generated by
a project is publicly observable and hence verifiable. Yet, because of the
measurement error ε it is not possible to infer precisely the choice of project
from the observation of output. In contrast with output, we assume that the
agent’s cost of implementing a project is not verifiable. The assumption that
all direct benefits for the principal are verifiable is not essential. The model
can easily be extended to situations where in addition to the contractible
output the principal receives some private benefits from a project. Similarly,
some part of the agent’s cost or benefit might be verifiable.
In our analysis we have to compare the payoffs from different contrac-
tual arrangements. As project decisions are not contractible, the contracting
problem involves an incentive restriction for the party maintaining the deci-
sion right. From the literature on such problems it is well–known that this
is practically impossible unless certain restrictions on the form of contracts
are imposed (see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983)). For this reason, we re-
strict ourselves to payment schemes that are linear in the observed output.
A compensation scheme for the agent consists of a base amount α ≥ 0 plus
a portion β ∈ [0, 1] of the realised output. Thus, depending on the choice of
project and the realisation of ε, the agent’s wage is
α+ β (Xi + ε) . (2)
The principal’s overall payoff is the project’s output minus the compensation
paid to the agent. We take the principal to be risk–neutral. Therefore, his
expected payoff is
V (di, α, β) ≡ (1− β)Xi − α. (3)
The agent’s payoff is the difference between his wage income and his cost of
implementing a project. We assume that the agent has exponential utility
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with a constant rate ρ > 0 of absolute risk aversion. Therefore, his expected
utility can be written as
U(di, α, β) ≡ β Xi − ρ
2
β2σ2 + α− Ci. (4)
The agent’s reservation utility from his best outside option is zero. In what
follows, we assume that the principal has all the bargaining power so that
he can make a take–it–or–leave–it offer to the agent. Yet, it is important to
notice that the allocation of authority under an optimal contract is indepen-
dent of the distribution of bargaining power between the principal and the
agent. Different divisions of the available bargaining surplus affect only the
base amount α in the agent’s compensation.
The purpose of our analysis is to study the allocation of decision rights
when the selection of projects is not observable to outsiders. Yet, as a bench–
mark it may be helpful to consider first the case where the choice of project
is verifiable and can be made part of the contract between the principal and
his agent. In this case, a contract specifies a project in combination with a
payment scheme. The principal’s problem is then to maximize his expected
payoff subject to the agent’s individual rationality constraint, i.e.
max di,α,β V (di, α, β) subject to U(di, α, β) ≥ 0. (5)
The solution of this problem is straight–forward: Since only the agent is
risk–averse, he should not bear any output risk so that β = 0. Indeed, the
principal is able to appropriate the entire surplus Xi−Ci from project di by
setting (α, β) = (Ci, 0). Therefore, under an optimal contract a project will
be selected that maximizes Xi−Ci. For what follows, we define Si ≡ Xi−Ci
as the first–best surplus from project di. We say that project di ∈ D is first–
best efficient if Si ≥ Sj for all dj ∈ D.
We now turn to the case where only the allocation of authority, i.e. the
right to decide, is contractible. We describe the allocation of the decision
right by h ∈ {P,A}. Thus, if h = P the principal retains the right to select
d ∈ D; if h = A he delegates the selection of a project to the agent. The
principal now solves the following problem:
maxh,di,α,β V (di, α, β) (6)
subject to
U(di, α, β) ≥ 0, (7)
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and
di ∈ argmaxd V (d, α, β) if h = P, (8)
di ∈ argmaxd U(d, α, β) if h = A.
The difference between this problem and the problem considered previously in
(5) are the incentive constraints in (8): When only authority is contractible,
project di is selected at the discretion of the party who maintains the de-
cision right. In contrast with standard moral–hazard problems, here the
allocation of the decision right determines whether an incentive restriction
for the principal or the agent becomes relevant.
A simple observation shows that problem (6) induces the implementation
of the first–best project whenever the set D of feasible decisions contains only
two elements. To see this, suppose that D = {dA, dB} with SA ≥ SB. Since
SA = V (dA, α, 0) + U(dA, α, 0) ≥ V (dB, α, 0) + U(dB, α, 0) = SB, at least
one of two parties prefers project dA over dB under a contract with β = 0.
Therefore, by the appropriate choice of h the incentive constraint (8) can be
made consistent with a contract that otherwise specifies di = dA, α = CA and
β = 0. It is easy to see that this contract also satisfies the agent’s participation
constraint (7). As a result, the efficient allocation of authority enables the
principal to realise the first–best surplus from the first–best efficient project
in any environment where one out of two available projects has to be selected!
To illustrate the distortions that can arise when merely decision rights
but not decisions themselves are contractible, it is sufficient to consider the
case of three projects. In the remainder of this section we assume that
D = {d0, dL, dH} and
0 ≤ X0 < XL < XH , 0 ≤ C0 < CL < CH . (9)
Thus, the higher a project’s expected output the higher is the agent’s private
cost of implementing the project. Under optimal risk–sharing this creates a
natural conflict between the principal and the agent: While the agent prefers
a smaller project, the principal prefers a larger project. One possible appli-
cation is the restructuring decision in a firm that is owned by the principal
and managed by the agent. Decision d0 can be interpreted as maintaining
the status quo, while dL indicates a ‘minor’ and dH a ‘major’ restructuring
of the firm.
We further assume that
CL − C0
XL −X0 <
CH − CL
XH −XL . (10)
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This assumption reflects increasing ‘marginal’ costs, because the change in
cost relative to the change in expected output is higher when switching from
project dL to dH than from d0 to dL.
There are two constellations under which the incentive restriction (8) in
problem (6) can be satisfied without reducing the principal’s payoff:
Proposition 1 If d0 is first–best efficient, the agent has the decision right
under the optimal contract and the principal receives the first–best surplus
from project d0. If dH is first–best efficient, the principal retains the deci-
sion right under the optimal contract and receives the first–best surplus from
project dH .
Clearly, under a contract with β = 0 the agent selects project d0 to mini-
mize his cost. Hence the principal can extract the entire surplus from project
d0 by setting h = A and α = C0. Similarly, project dH is the principal’s pre-
ferred project. Therefore, under a contract with h = P, α = CH and β = 0
he can appropriate the surplus SH .
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, it is possible to allocate the de-
cision right in such a way that implementing the first–best efficient project
does not conflict with efficient risk–sharing. This is no longer possible when
the intermediate project dL is first–best efficient. To induce the agent to
select project dL rather than d0, he has to be compensated by some share of
the output. This implies inefficient risk–sharing and prevents the principal
from realising the first–best surplus of project dL. To state our next result,
we define a critical level of project risk by
σ¯2 ≡ (SL −max[S0, SH ])2
ρ
(XL −X0)2
(CL − C0)2 . (11)
Note that σ¯2 ≥ 0 when project dL is first–best efficient. In Figure 1, σ¯2
represents the borderline between region I and II + III.
Proposition 2 Let project dL be first–best efficient. If σ
2 < σ¯2, then under
the optimal contract the agent has the decision right and project dL is imple-
mented. If σ2 > σ¯2 and SH > S0, the principal has the decision right and
selects project dH ; if σ
2 > σ¯2 and S0 > SH , the agent has the decision right
and selects project d0.
Proof: Since dH = argmaxd V (d, α, β) project dL can only be implemented
by setting h = A. The agent chooses dL if β XL−CL ≥ max[βX0−C0, βXH−
8
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Figure 1: Decision Rights and Project Risk
CH ] i.e. if
CL − C0
XL −X0 ≤ β ≤
CH − CL
XH −XL . (12)
Accordingly under a contract with h = A, d = dL, β = (CL−C0)/(XL−X0)
and α = CL − βXL + 0.5 ρ β2 σ2 the principal can realise the payoff
SL − σ2 ρ
2
(CL − C0)2
(XL −X0)2 . (13)
Alternatively, he can obtain the payoff S0 or SH by setting (h, di, α, β) =
(A, d0, C0, 0) or (h, di, α, β) = (P, dH , CH , 0), respectively. Therefore, imple-
menting project dL is optimal if σ
2 < σ¯2, where σ¯2 is defined in (11). If
σ2 > σ¯2, then the optimal contract is either (h, di, α, β) = (A, d0, C0, 0) or
(h, di, α, β) = (P, dH , CH , 0) depending on whether S0 > SH or SH > S0.
Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates our results for the case S0 < SL:
6 Under the parameter
constellations in region I, the agent has the decision right and chooses project
dL, which is also first–best efficient. Yet, his compensation scheme involves
some bearing of the project risk and so the principal gets less than the full
surplus SL. Therefore, implementing project dL is no longer optimal if the
risk σ2 becomes too high. This happens in region II, where again the agent
6In the case S0 > SL either d0 or dH is first–best efficient, and so by Proposition 1 the
first–best is implementable.
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has the decision right but now selects project d0. In this region the principal
realises the payoff S0, which is less than the first–best surplus SL but still
higher than SH . Finally, in region III the principal retains the authority
to choose project dH . His decision is first–best efficient only in the part of
region III where SH ≥ SL.
The optimal allocation of authority responds to the problem that deci-
sions generate externalities: On the one hand, the agent tends to minimize
his cost, thereby neglecting the impact of his decision on the principal’s out-
put. On the other hand, the principal favors projects with a high output
because he ignores the agent’s cost. To internalize these effects by a compen-
sation scheme is costly because this generates inefficiencies in the allocation
of risk. As a consequence, the principal delegates the decision right to the
agent when it is optimal to implement a project with relatively low costs.
When implementing a large–scale project with high output and high cost is
optimal, the principal retains the authority to decide. This causes decisions
to be biased: Depending on which party holds the decision right, there is a
tendency towards a selection of projects that are either too small or too large
relative to the first–best.7
3 Effort Incentives
While the authority over a wide range of decisions in an organization may
contractually allocated, there are also some activities where decision rights
are inalienable. A contract may endow the principal with the right to de-
termine on which project the agent has to work; it is however beyond the
principal’s direct control to determine how much imagination and enthusiasm
the agent develops for his job. In this section, we consider the interaction
between the allocation of authority and private effort incentives. As an ex-
ample, a firm’s charter may specify whether the firm owner or the manager
is entitled to take certain restructuring decisions. But it always remains for
the manager to decide how much effort he exerts on restructuring the firm.
In this section project di ∈ D in combination with the agent’s effort choice
ej ∈ E results in the verifiable random output
Xi(ej) + ε, (14)
where, as before, ε is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2 > 0. The agent’s non–contractible cost of spending effort ej on project di
7These inefficiencies cannot be negotiated away because decisions are not only ex ante
but also ex post non–verifiable.
10
is Ci(ej). Under a linear compensation scheme (α, β) the principal’s receives
the expected payoff
V (di, ej, α, β) ≡ (1− β)Xi(ej)− α; (15)
and the agent’s expected utility is
U(di, ej, α, β) ≡ β Xi(ej)− ρ
2
β2σ2 + α− Ci(ej). (16)
The agent chooses his effort after a project has been determined. Even
though the decision di ∈ D is not publicly verifiable, we assume that di is
observed by the agent also when the principal has the decision right. The
incentive constraint for the agent’s effort choice is therefore
ej(d) ∈ argmaxe U(d, e, α, β), (17)
for all d ∈ D. Depending on the allocation of authority h ∈ {P,A}, project
di ∈ D is implementable if
di ∈ argmaxd V (d, ej(d), α, β) if h = P, (18)
di ∈ argmaxd U(d, ej(d), α, β) if h = A.
The principal’s problem is to design a contract (h, di, ej, α, β) so as to max-
imize his expected payoff subject to the agent’s individual rationality con-
straint and the incentive constraints (17) and (18).
To investigate the impact of effort incentives on the allocation of author-
ity, we assume that D = {d0, dR}, E = {eL, eH} and
X0(eL) = X0(eH) = X0, XR(eL) = XR, XR(eH) = XR +XE, (19)
with XE > 0. Thus the output under the ‘status quo’ d0 is independent of
the agent’s effort. The expected output from project dR, however, increases
by the amount XE if the agent invests high effort eH rather than low effort
eL. We denote the agent’s effort cost as KE > 0 so that for each project
di ∈ D:
Ci(eL) = Ci, Ci(eH) = Ci +KE. (20)
Regarding the selection of projects, the principal and the agent have con-
flicting interests because
0 ≤ X0 < XR, 0 ≤ C0 < CR. (21)
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Finally, to make the problem interesting, we assume that
XE −KE > 0, XR +XE − CR −KE > X0 − C0. (22)
This ensures that project dR in combination with high effort eH is first–best
efficient. If this were not the case, it would never be optimal to implement
high effort and the moral hazard constraint (17) would become irrelevant.
In the previous section we have seen that, in the absence of private effort
decisions, the first–best project can be realised when D contains only two
elements. Indeed, if effort were contractible, the optimal contract would
prescribe high effort eH and assign the right of control overD to the principal,
who would ratify project dR. Thus under a compensation scheme with α =
CR + KE and β = 0, the principal could appropriate the first–best surplus
of the first–best efficient project. Of course, this is no longer possible with
non–contractible effort, because the agent would not exert high effort under
a payment scheme with β = 0. But it is worth noting that whenever the
optimal contract allocates the control right over D to the agent, this is so
because of the effort incentive constraint (17).
When working on project dR, the agent selects high effort eH only if
U(dR, eH , α, β) ≥ U(dR, eL, α, β), which is equivalent to
β ≥ KE
XE
. (23)
Let S0 ≡ X0 − C0 and SR ≡ XR − CR. The following lemma shows that the
provision of effort incentives makes project dR more attractive for the agent
if the surplus difference SR − S0 exceeds some critical value.
Lemma 1 Under a contract with β = KE/XE the agent prefers project dR
and effort eH to project d0 and effort eL if and only if
SR − S0 ≥ S¯ ≡ (CR − C0)XE −KE
KE
. (24)
Proof: The condition U(dR, eH , α, β) ≥ U(d0, eL, α, β) is equivalent to
β(XR +XE)− CR −KE ≥ βX0 − C0. (25)
For β = KE/XE, it is easy to show that this inequality is identical to
(24). Q.E.D.
12
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Figure 2: Effort Incentives
As in the previous section, it turns out that the level of project risk
influences the optimal allocation of control rights. Here the critical value of
risk is
σˆ2 ≡ (XE −KE −max[S0 − SR, 0])2
ρ
X2E
K2E
. (26)
Note that σˆ2 depends positively on the productivity XE and negatively on
the cost KE of high effort. In Figure 2, σˆ
2 represents the borderline between
region I + II and region III.
We first consider the case S0 > SR. In this case, implementing project dR
is optimal only if at the same time the agent is induced to invest high effort.
This, however, creates a distortion in the allocation of risk so that project d0
becomes more attractive for high values of σ2.
Proposition 3 Let S0 > SR. If σ
2 < σˆ2, then under the optimal contract
the principal has the decision right and project dR together with effort eH is
implemented. If σ2 > σˆ2, the agent has the decision right and selects project
d0 in combination with effort eL.
Proof: It follows by Lemma 1 that the choice of project dR can be imple-
mented if and only if h = P. By setting β = KE/XE and α so that the agent’s
individual rationality constraint is fulfilled, the principal gets the payoff
SR +XE −KE − σ2 ρ
2
K2E
X2E
. (27)
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Alternatively, he can implement project d0 by setting h = A, α = C0 and
β = 0 to extract the first–best surplus S0. If σ
2 < σˆ2 the first option yields
a higher payoff; if σ2 > σˆ2 the second option yields a higher payoff. Q.E.D.
We now turn to the case S0 < SR, in which project dR always generates
a higher surplus, independently of the agent’s effort choice. The optimal
contract provides an incentive for high effort as long as the project risk is
not too high.
Proposition 4 Let SR > S0. Then it is always optimal that the principal
has the decision right; if σ2 < σˆ2 and SR−S0 ≥ S¯, it is also optimal that the
agent has the decision right. Project dR is implemented together with effort
eH or eL depending on whether σ
2 < σˆ2 or σ2 > σˆ2.
Proof: Under a contract with h = P, α = CR and β = 0 the agent chooses
effort eL and so the principal gets the payoff SR. Therefore, implementing
project d0 is never optimal. Alternatively, as we have shown in the proof of
Proposition 3, the principal can induce the effort eH and realise the payoff in
(27). This payoff is higher (lower) than SR if σ
2 < σˆ2 (σ2 > σˆ2). If σ2 < σˆ2
and SR− S0 ≥ S¯, by Lemma 1 also the agent prefers project dR because the
optimal contract satisfies β = KE/XE. Q.E.D.
Figure 2 summarizes our results: The provision of effort incentives is
too costly in regions I and II. In these regions the allocation of authority
depends on which project yields a higher surplus with low effort: Since S0 >
SR in region I, the principal delegates the decision right to the agent who
selects project d0. In contrast, in region II, where SR > S0, project dR is
chosen under the principal’s authority. Only in region III the agent exerts
high effort on project dR. In part (a) of this region the principal maintains
the decision right; in part (b) the optimal allocation of decision rights is
indeterminate because also the agent prefers project dR over d0.
We conclude from our analysis that the agent’s private choice of effort
expands the range of parameter constellations under which he receives the
authority over project decisions. This observation is similar to Aghion and
Tirole (1997) who show that delegation improves the agent’s incentives for
information gathering before a project is selected. In our model, however,
the agent selects his effort ex post and his choice is determined by the com-
pensation scheme rather than the allocation of authority. The driving force
behind our results are complementarities between effort and project deci-
sions. Indeed, there are two different effects: First, the trade–off between
incentives and risk makes projects that require more effort less attractive to
14
implement. In our setting, where the effectiveness of effort increases with
project size, this favors the delegation of authority because the agent is more
inclined than the principal to select low cost projects. This effect occurs in
region I of Figure 2. The second effect is that under a compensation scheme
which induces high effort, the agent also partially internalizes the impact of
his decision on the principal’s output. As in region III(b) of Figure 2, this
diminution of the externality problem enhances the agent’s qualification for
authority.
4 Asymmetric Information
Information, which is important for the efficiency of choice, is often local-
ized and dispersed throughout an organization. Typically, different members
have access to different information. Their willingness to communicate their
private information may be stimulated by monetary incentives. But at least
equally important is the allocation of control rights. This is so because the
subordinates take into account how the decision maker reacts to the revela-
tion of information. Their incentives to report truthfully depend on whether
this has positive or negative consequences for their own benefits. Therefore,
communication incentives and the allocation of authority interact with each
other.
Actually, the optimal design of an organization may require the allocation
of authority itself to be contingent on revealed information. In this section
we show that such a transfer of control rights may facilitate the exchange of
information.8 We assume that the agent is privately informed about some
‘state of the world’ θ; he is willing to share his information with the principal
if the latter contractually commits himself to delegate the decision right in
certain states.9
We assume that the principal’s verifiable gross benefit from project di ∈
D,
θXi + ε, (28)
depends not only on the measurement error ε but also on the state of the
world, represented by the random variable θ ≥ 0. The agent is privately
8In an incomplete information framework, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2001) show
that the transfer of control rights can be used to allow the other party to establish a
reputation for future cooperation.
9See also Aghion and Bolton (1992) who demonstrate in a model of debt financing that
it may be optimal to transfer control in certain publicly observable states of the world.
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informed about the true value of the parameter θ; the principal, however,
only knows the distribution function F (θ) at the contracting stage.
If project di ∈ D is undertaken, the agent incurs the non–verifiable cost
Ci. Therefore, under a linear compensation scheme (α, β), the payoffs of the
principal and the agent in state θ are given by
V (di, α, β|θ) ≡ (1− β)θ Xi − α, (29)
U(di, α, β|θ) ≡ β θXi − ρ
2
β2σ2 + α− Ci.
The principal’s expected payoff at the contracting stage is∫
θ
V (di, α, β|θ) dF (θ). (30)
Since the efficiency of project selection depends on the state θ, the prin-
cipal will optimally ask the agent to reveal his information. Indeed, by the
Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the op-
timal contract induces the agent to report θ truthfully.10 Contingent on
the agent’s report θ, the contract specifies a decision di(θ), a compensation
scheme (α(θ), β(θ)) and the allocation of the decision right h(θ). We denote
by
HP ≡ {θ|h(θ) = P}, HA ≡ {θ|h(θ) = A}, (31)
the set of states in which the principal and the agent, respectively, become
endowed with the decision right.
Since decisions are non–contractible, a contract has to satisfy the usual
incentive restrictions:
di(θ) ∈ argmaxd V (d, α(θ), β(θ)|θ) if h(θ) = P, (32)
di(θ) ∈ argmaxd U(d, α(θ), β(θ)|θ) if h(θ) = A.
Further, the agent should not be able to gain by misrepresenting the true
state. This is ensured by the ‘truthtelling–constraints’:
U(di(θ), α(θ), β(θ)|θ) ≥ U(di(θ′), α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ) for all θ′ ∈ HP , (33)
U(di(θ), α(θ), β(θ)|θ) ≥ maxdU(d, α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ) for all θ′ ∈ HA.
10The Revelation Principle is applicable here, even though the principal cannot contrac-
tually commit to a decision. This is so because his choice does not depend on the value
of θ that the agent reports. If this were not the case, the modified Revelation Principle of
Bester and Strausz (2001) could be used to derive the optimal contract.
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The first of these constraint guarantees that the agent has no incentive to
misreport some state θ′ ∈ HP when the true state is θ. Similarly, by the
second constraint the agent cannot gain by misreporting some state θ′ ∈ HA.
The optimal contract for the principal maximizes his expected payoff in (30)
subject to the agent’s individual rationality constraint and the restrictions
in (32) and (33).
Under perfect information the optimal contract would not have to satisfy
the truthtelling–constraints in (33). But, there are situations where also
under asymmetric information they are not binding. As we have seen in
Section 2, if D contains only two projects, then under perfect information the
principal always obtains the first–best surplus from the project implemented
in state θ. Similarly, if the project risk σ2 is too high, the agent will optimally
bear no risk and so the principal gets the entire project surplus. Whenever
this is the case, there is no conflict between the allocation of decision rights
and communication incentives.11
Proposition 5 If the optimal contract under perfect information satisfies
β = 0 in each state θ, then the corresponding allocation of decision rights is
optimal also under asymmetric information.
Proof: Let X(di) ≡ Xi and C(di) ≡ Ci. Note that under perfect informa-
tion the agent’s individual rationality constraint is always binding so that
U(di(θ), α(θ), β(θ)|θ) = 0 for all θ. Suppose that the first condition in (33) is
not satisfied for some θ′ ∈ HP . Then
U(di(θ
′), α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ) = β(θ′) θ X(di(θ′))− (34)
ρ
2
β(θ′)2σ2 + α(θ′)− C(di(θ′)) > 0.
But, by individual rationality,
U(di(θ
′), α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ′) = β(θ′) θ′X(di(θ′))− (35)
ρ
2
β(θ′)2σ2 + α(θ′)− C(di(θ′)) = 0.
In combination with (34) this implies β(θ′)[θ − θ′]X(di(θ′)) > 0, a contra-
diction to β(θ′) = 0. Now suppose that the second condition in (33) is not
satisfied for some θ′ ∈ HA. Then there exists a d ∈ D such that
U(d, α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ) = β(θ′) θ X(d)− (36)
ρ
2
β(θ′)2σ2 + α(θ′)− C(d) > 0.
11 Notice that the following result also holds generally if the project output is non–
verifiable, because then one must have β = 0.
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Since θ′ ∈ HA, we have
U(di(θ
′), α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ′) = 0 ≥ U(d, α(θ′), β(θ′)|θ′) = (37)
β(θ′) θ′X(d)− ρ
2
β(θ′)2σ2 + α(θ′)− C(d).
By (36) and (37) we have β(θ′)[θ − θ′]X(d) > 0, again a contradiction to
β(θ′) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 indicates that asymmetric information generates additional
distortions only when monetary incentives are used to influence the agent’s
decision behavior. To illustrate the result, let D = {d0, dR} with
X0 < XR, C0 < CR (38)
and denote by
θ∗ ≡ CR − C0
XR −X0 (39)
the critical value of θ for which both projects generate the same surplus.
Under perfect information, project dR is optimal for all θ > θ
∗. In these states,
the principal thus retains the decision right and pays the agent α(θ) = CR
for working on project dR. In all other states, the agent gets the payment
α(θ) = C0 and has the right to select d0. It is easy to see that the same
arrangement is feasible also when only the agent knows the true value of
θ: If θ < θ∗, the agent cannot gain by misreporting some θ′ > θ∗ because
he would then loose the right to select the low cost project d0. Similarly,
if θ > θ∗, the agent could get the decision right by reporting θ′ < θ∗. Yet,
this does not increase his payoff because he has to pay CR − C0 for the
right. Effectively, trading authority supports truthful revelation of private
information.
5 Multistage Decisions
In reality, most organizations face a steady flow of decision problems rather
than a single problem. Also, typically it is not a single party that is in
charge for all decisions. Instead decision rights are often decentralized and
control rights in different areas are divided between different parties. As
an example, a firm may first have to decide whether or not to develop a
new product. When a new product has been made available, a marketing
strategy has to be chosen. It is not necessary and may not be desirable that
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the same party has authority over decisions in both the development and the
marketing stage.
In this section we consider a two-stage decision problem. We show that,
depending on complementarities between the sequence of decisions, the op-
timal governance structure may endow the principal with the control right
at one stage and the agent at the other. This also indicates that it may be
advantageous to split the overall decision process into several sub–decision
stages. This allows the organization to fine–tune the allocation of decision
rights and may enhance the efficiency of project selection.
In the first stage of the decision process, a decision di ∈ D1 is selected.
This decision may affect the set of decisions D2(di) that are feasible at stage
2. Depending on the decisions di ∈ D1 and dj ∈ D2(di), the principal receives
the output Xij + ε and the agent’s cost is Cij. Therefore, under a payment
scheme (α, β) the principal’s and the agent’s expected payoffs are
V (di, dj, α, β) ≡ (1− β)Xij − α, (40)
U(di, dj, α, β) ≡ β Xij − ρ
2
β2σ2 + α− Cij.
In addition to the payment scheme, a contract specifies the allocation of the
decision right h1 ∈ {P,A} over D1 in stage 1 and h2 ∈ {P,A} over D2 in
stage 2.12
Even though decisions are not verifiable to outsiders, we assume that
the decision maker at stage 2 is informed about the first–stage decision.
Accordingly, implementability requires that the second–stage decision dj ∈
D2(di) satisfies
dj(di) ∈ argmaxd V (di, d, α, β) if h2 = P, (41)
dj(di) ∈ argmaxd U(di, d, α, β) if h2 = A,
for a given di ∈ D1. The party who is in control over D1 in stage 1 anticipates
the second–stage decision described in (41). Thus di ∈ D1 has to satisfy the
incentive restriction
di ∈ argmaxd V (d, dj(d), α, β) if h1 = P, (42)
di ∈ argmaxd U(d, dj(d), α, β) if h1 = A.
The principal’s objective is to design a governance structure (h1, h2) and mon-
etary transfers (α, β) so that the implemented sequence of decisions (di, dj)
maximizes the joint surplus V + U.
12Note that h2 cannot be made contingent on d1 because d1 is not contractible.
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Figure 3: Multistage Decisions
To show that there may be gains from decentralizing authority, we con-
sider a variation of the environment in Section 2: In stage 1 the feasible
set D1 = {d0, dR} contains two possible decisions. If d0 is selected, the de-
cision process ends, i.e. D2(d0) = ∅, and project d0 is implemented. If,
however, dR is chosen in stage 1, then in the second stage either project
dL or dH can be selected, i.e. D2(dR) = {dL, dH}. For simplicity, denote
XL ≡ XRL, XH ≡ XRH , CL ≡ CRL, and CH ≡ CRH . Figure 3 illustrates the
sequence of decisions and the resulting expected outputs and costs of the
three possible projects.
As in Section 2 we assume that
0 ≤ X0 < XL < XH , 0 ≤ C0 < CL < CH . (43)
The first–best surplus from project dk ∈ {d0, dL, dH} is Sk ≡ Xk−Ck; project
dk is first–best efficient if Sk ≥ S` for all d`. It follows from (43) that, after
dR has been selected, the agent will choose dL if he has the decision right
in the second stage, whereas the principal will choose dH in this situation.
Moreover, in the first stage the agent prefers d0 while the principal prefers
dR. These considerations immediately lead to the following result:
Proposition 6 The optimal contract specifies h1 = P and h2 = A if project
dL is first–best efficient. Otherwise, either h1 = h2 = A or h1 = h2 = P is
optimal depending on whether S0 > SH or SH > S0. The principal always
receives the first–best surplus from the implemented project.
Under the single–stage decision procedure in Section 2 the principal could
not appropriate the first–best surplus from project dL. Here this is possible by
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dividing control rights between the principal and the agent in the first and the
second stage of the decision process. This arrangement limits the excessive
power of either party and facilitates the implementation of ‘intermediate’–
size projects.
Proposition 6 also indicates that decentralizing decision procedures by
defining different areas of control may enhance the overall efficiency of the
organization. Indeed, as we have seen in Section 2, in a single–stage decision
problem the principal can always achieve the first–best when only two choices
are available. By a simple backward induction argument this observation
can be extended to multi–stage decision procedures: Whenever at each stage
one out of two possible decisions has to be selected, then it is possible to
allocate the decision rights at the various stages in such a way that the final
outcome maximizes the joint surplus of the principal and the agent! Thus,
especially in complex situations where the overall project selection involves
a large number of different aspects, sequential decision procedures with a
divided–control arrangement are likely to be optimal.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a simple theory of the optimal assignment
of decision rights in the theory of the firm. The basic idea is that in a
world of incomplete contracts monetary incentives cannot fully reflect the
impact of decisions on the benefits and costs of all members of the firm.
Therefore, the party who has authority over decisions does not take these
externalities into account and its objective is not identical to maximizing the
firm’s overall surplus. Also, because the members of the firm have conflicting
interests, the surplus that can be realised depends on the identity of the
decision maker. The optimal allocation of authority assigns the decision right
to the party whose objective can be aligned most closely with maximizing
the joint surplus. Even though incentive payments may be insufficient to
implement the first–best decision, monetary transfers play an important role
in our analysis. They allow distributing the realised surplus so that authority
becomes tradeable between the members of the firm.
Our model can easily integrate other factors that may be important for
the design of organizations. We have discussed the role of effort incentives,
asymmetric information and multi–stage decision procedures. Our analysis
has been confined to a two–person environment where a principal requires an
agent to undertake a single project. One desirable extension is to consider
a multi–person organization facing a number of decision problems. This
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would allow studying more complex forms of authority relationships. Finally,
our approach is applicable not only to the theory of the firm but also to
other organizations. A potentially interesting application is, for example,
the distribution of authority between different governmental institutions.
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